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Abstract. Traditional electricity meters are replaced by Smart Meters
in customers’ households. Smart Meters collects fine-grained utility con-
sumption profiles from customers, which in turn enables the introduction
of dynamic, time-of-use tariffs. However, the fine-grained usage data that
is compiled in this process also allows to infer the inhabitant’s personal
schedules and habits. We propose a privacy-preserving protocol that en-
ables billing with time-of-use tariffs without disclosing the actual con-
sumption profile to the supplier. Our approach relies on a zero-knowledge
proof based on Pedersen Commitments performed by a plug-in privacy
component that is put into the communication link between Smart Me-
ter and supplier’s back-end system. We require no changes to the Smart
Meter hardware and only small changes to the software of Smart Meter
and back-end system. In this paper we describe the functional and pri-
vacy requirements, the specification and security proof of our solution
and give a performance evaluation of a prototypical implementation.
1 Introduction
1.1 Motivation
Smart Meter roll-outs have begun all over the world [1]. Smart Meters record a
fine-grained consumption profile of a certain service (electricity, heat or water)
and report it to the supplier of the service who bills the customer accordingly.
Traditionally only a single, compiled value for a whole reporting period has been
reported to the supplier (e.g., the total consumed electrical energy of the last
year). In contrast, Smart Meters transmit a detailed set of many data points
which document consumption for short time intervals (e.g. every 15 minutes).
This enables the suppliers to introduce more dynamic pricing schemes and to
collect precise data about their customer base’s usage patterns.
Besides the technical motivation, also legal reasons come into play in re-
spect to the current push towards Smart Metering: For instance, in Germany
starting October 2010 suppliers must offer either time or load dependent tariffs
(see §40 [15]). These tariffs necessarily require Smart Meters with fine-grained
consumption recording.
However, such detailed data has privacy implications: A listening third party,
the supplier or even an employee of the supplier could learn the consumption
behavior of a customer and might use this information maliciously for other
purposes than intended (e.g, to learn behavioral patterns, such as sleep/wake
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cycles or vacation time, of a given customer based on his energy usage). Re-
cently, customers have become aware of the potential privacy implications of
such consumption profiles. In the Netherlands Smart Meter roll-outs have been
stopped because of the public outcry about the invasion of customer privacy [11].
Grid operators and suppliers now face a dilemma: On the one hand, they
need to implement Smart Metering for legal and technical reasons. But, on the
other hand, they face on-going problems in respect to public acceptance of the
technology due to the outlined privacy problems.
1.2 Our solution
We provide a solution to this conflict by introducing a new consumption profile
reporting protocol for time-of-use tariffs. We introduce a plug-in privacy com-
ponent into the standardized Smart Meter / Meter Data Management (MDM)
reporting communication link. This component hides the actual consumption
profile from the MDM and therefore also from the supplier. We require only small
changes compared to current Smart Meter reporting. The plug-in privacy com-
ponent intercepts Smart Meter readings, then uses tariff information provided
externally (over the Internet or by the MDM) to calculate the billing amount
and sends only the resulting billing amount to the MDM. A Zero-Knowledge
Proof ensures the correctness of the calculation.
The advantages of our approach are the following:
1. The Smart Meter’s hardware complexity remains the same, because all calcu-
lations are conducted by the stand-alone plug-in component. Such a plug-in
component can be realized by off-the-shelf computing hardware like a router
or Wifi access point or even by software running on a standard personal
computer.
2. The supplier does not have to trust the plug-in privacy component. The
privacy component’s output suffices to check whether it calculated the final
billing amount honestly and correctly, i.e. based on the correct tariff and
on the correct readings provided by the Smart Meter. Therefore the pri-
vacy component does not require hardware-protected components and can
be quite simple and cheap. The correct operation of the privacy component
can be verified only by its output.
3. Plaintext, fine-grained consumption profiles never even leave the household,
if a privacy component is used. This prevents any abuse of this data, either by
intercepting it in transit, by leakage in the MDM systems or by the MDM’s
operator himself. It also spares the MDM expensive security measures for the
protection of the massive amount of privacy related data – the consumption
profiles of his customers.
1.3 Paper outline
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows: Section 2 motivates the
problem, gives a short introduction into Smart Metering and its privacy prob-
lems and defines our problem statement. In Section 3 we describe the underlying
cryptographic method of our solution before we explain the setup of our solu-
tion, the specification of the protocol and its security analysis in Section 4.
We evaluate a prototypical implementation in Section 5. Furthermore we show
how our protocol might fit into existing Smart Meter communication protocols
and how it fulfills the stakeholder requirements. Finally, we give an overview of
related work in Section 6, provide an outlook on future work in Section 7 and
conclude with a summary in Section 8.
2 Smart Metering’s implications for Privacy
2.1 Naming conventions
Before we explore the Smart Meter billing process and deduct its privacy impli-
cations, we briefly specify the terms used in the rest of this paper:
Customer: The term ”customer” represents the household, family or person
that receives the service from a supplier.
Supplier: The term ”supplier” stands as placeholder for all companies that
cooperate in order to provide the service to customers and also want to
subsequently invoice the customers for this service.
Consumption profile: The term ”consumption profile” stands for the con-
sumption data collected by Smart Meters for service in a certain interval
over a certain period of time. This is applicable to many utilities (electricity,
water, heat, gas, etc.).
Back-end system: Usually, the Smart Meter is directly connected to a MDM
which just collects consumption data. Tariffs, are then applied in the sup-
plier’s billing systems where the data is subsequently transported to. In this
paper, ”back-end system” (BS) stands for the collection of all IT-systems
that collect consumption profiles and use them to calculate the invoice for
the customer based on tariffs.
Tariff: The term ”tariff” stands for the price schema, i.e., the price of service
consumption at a specific interval. In the following we restrict ourselves
to a time-of-use pricing scheme, but our protocol could also handle load-
dependent billing with little modification.
2.2 Smart metering billing
Smart Metering refers to the collection of consumption profiles at customer’s
households with the help of so called Smart Meters (SM). Smart Meters measure
electricity consumption in households and communicate their readings at regular
intervals to the back-end system. Alternatively, the back-end system can also
query the Smart Meter for its data (pull). A Trusted Platform Module (TPM)
in the Smart Meter holds key material and creates signatures over the data
to ensure authenticity and integrity until it arrives at the back-end system.
There the consumption profile and the tariff data from the respective customer’s
contract are used to calculated the price the customer has to pay for the time
period covered by the profile. Figure 1 displays the usual Smart Meter setup.
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Fig. 1. Traditional setup of Smart Meter and back-end system
2.3 Privacy concerns
Smart Metering has encountered massive privacy concerns from media [12], data
privacy experts [6] and consumers [11]. The fact that whole consumption pro-
files of households are transmitted to and stored by suppliers is troubling w.r.t.
customer privacy. Data confidentiality can be easily protected in transit between
SM and BS. However, their storage at the suppliers’ IT-systems still endangers
customer privacy. Depending on resolution and the availability of different ser-
vices’ profiles (e.g. water, heat, electricity) one can read the profile and ”see”
more or less clearly what happens in the household: For instance, when fam-
ily members wake up (light switched on), whether they shower in the morning
(water, heat, and electricity for water heater), whether they drink hot beverages
with their breakfast and when or if they leave for work or school. Furthermore,
the frequency of washing and drying clothes, cooking or the amount of time
the TV is turned on can be inferred. For further research on what electricity
consumption profiles tell about the inhabitants see [21] or [3].
These inferences make consumption profiles very privacy-sensitive data and
these profiles might even have value in the advertising market, for instance. On
one hand, disgruntled employees or external attackers might attempt to steal it
for profit or out of malice. On the other hand, the supplier could seek subsidiary
revenues by selling this data himself. Depending on the local jurisdiction, this
might even be legal.
The important point is, that currently there are no reliable, technical mea-
sures in place to prevent abuse of consumption profiles. Merely organizational
measures, policies or laws sanction the abuse of privacy related data but require
a trace or proof of abuse and do not prevent it in the first place.
2.4 Problem statement
The problem we tackle in this paper is to enable suppliers to do billing using
Smart Metering data without actually receiving privacy related data.
Supplier’s requirements The supplier’s requirement regarding consumption
profiles is the ability to reliably use the data in the consumption profile to
calculate the customer’s bill for received electricity. The consumption profile V
is a vector of n values vi that represent the amount of utility used in the interval
i of one day. The time-of-use tariff T is a vector of n ti where interval i is priced
with ti. ti and vi are integers. Then the formula for calculating the time-of-use
price for consumption of one day is
P (V, T ) =
n∑
i=0
ti ∗ vi
It is crucial for the supplier that the consumption profiles are accurate and
trustworthy. Clearly, a customer might be inclined to report lower consumption
than actually consumed, because it lowers his bill. Therefore the Smart Meters
are equipped with the TPM in order to ensure that the reported consumption
profiles are trustworthy and reliable.
Customers’ requirements In addition to the requirements of traditional me-
tering (accuracy of the bill), a customer of Smart Metering is concerned about
his privacy. The less information is leaked by the customer, the better for him.
We strive for ideal privacy, i.e. the view of the consumption profile by the sup-
plier is indistinguishable from a uniformly chosen consumption profile with the
same price, i.e. supplier obtains no additional information to the price.
Infrastructure constraints A major constraint for the infrastructure invest-
ments in Smart Metering is cost. Suppliers have to replace conventional meters in
every household with a new Smart Meter. This is a significant amount of money
for a complete roll-out even for a utilities’ provider. Therefore every technology
built into a Smart Meter faces scrutiny w.r.t. to costs.
This also includes the security measures like TPMs and secure storage. The
development and verification of a secure TPM is very expensive and therefore
it is common practice to keep its functionality minimal. One naive approach to
privacy-preserving billing of consumption profiles would be to calculate the price
in the TPM itself. But this would require that tariff information are retrieved and
verified by the TPM. In turn, this would require adding an input communication
channel and module to the TPM and would consequently increase the costs for
building and verifying the TPM considerably.
Legal constraints Depending on the jurisdiction, metering can be subject to
legal requirements. In Germany, for instance, metrology laws [16] govern require a
certain degree accuracy of the meter and measurements and the tamperproofness
of the meter. Privacy laws [17] require the confidentiality of readings to protect
consumers’ privacy. We translate this into the technical requirements of Smart
Meter integrity and integrity and confidentiality of consumption profiles on the
wire and in computer systems.
3 Pedersen Commitments
The core of our proposed solution (which we present in Sec. 4) relies on Ped-
ersen Commitments [19]. In this section we briefly introduce the basics of this
cryptographic method. For further information on the scheme please refer to [19].
A commitment is a cryptographic tool with two functions:
– Commit(x, r) −→ c takes as input a value x and a random number r. As
output it produces the commitment c.
– Open(c, x, r) −→ >/⊥ takes as input a commitment c, a value x and a
random number r. It outputs >, if c is indeed a commitment to x and ⊥, if
not.
Commitments have two security properties:
– Secret: Given c it is hard to compute x.
– Binding: Given c, x and r it is hard to compute an x′ 6= x and r′, such that
Open(c, x′, r′) = >, i.e. c is a commitment for x′ as well.
They are used in the following way: Alice chooses a value x. She computes a
commitment c and sends it to Bob. Now, Alice and Bob may, for example, engage
in some computation that depends on Alice’s input x, but where Alice may no
longer change her mind. Alice opens her commitment and shows that everything
was indeed computed according to the value x she choose at the beginning.
A typical example is fair coin flip. Alice chooses a random s and sends the
commitment c of s to Bob. Bob chooses a random number t and sends it to
Alice. Alice now opens her commitment. The fair coin flip is x = s⊕ t (where ⊕
denotes “exclusive-or”). If the commitment was not secret, Bob could choose x.
If the commitment was not binding, Alice could choose x.
Pedersen commitments operate over a groupG. This groupG can be the same
elliptic curves as used of EC-DSA in the secure hardware of the Smart Meter.
Let g and h be two generators of G. Pedersen commitments are computed as
follows:
– Commit(x, r):
c = gxhr
– Open(c, x, r):
c
?
= gxhr =̂ c
?
= Commit(x, r)
The proofs of their security properties can be found in [19].
Pedersen commitments have another very useful property we exploit in this
paper. They are homomorphic, i.e. a multiplication of two commitments results
in a commitment to the sum of their committed values.
Commit(x, r)Commit(y, s) = Commit(x + y, r + s)
A commitment can also be multiplied by a plain factor y
Commit(x, r)y = Commit(xy, ry)
Note that both operations change the commitment c, such that the binding
security property is not violated. Instead one needs to open with the new input
values of the commitment.
4 The private billing protocol
In this section we describe our privacy-preserving Smart Meter billing protocol.
First we give a very abstract description in Section 4.1, then we provide the full
specification in Section 4.2 and provide a security analysis in Section 4.3.
4.1 Components and specification
The main idea of our approach is that the plaintext consumption profiles never
leave the household, but only after they have been processed by a pseudo-random
one-way function. Therefore, ideal privacy is preserved. We propose to introduce
a privacy component (PC) into the communication link of the Smart Meter
and the supplier’s back-end system. Its objective is to intercept reports of con-
sumption profiles and to let only processed information pass-through. The PC is
invisible to the SM and only the supplier will notice it: The PC directly interacts
with the supplier’s systems and consumption profiles will look different if a PC
is used. This setup is illustrated in Figure 2.
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Fig. 2. Setup of proposed solution with intermediate privacy component
The major difference to a standard Smart Metering setup is that the price
function P (V, T ) is not calculated at the supplier’s system. It is calculated in the
PC which is supposed to be located in the household. For this, the PC intercepts
the consumption profile and signed commitments sent to it by the Smart Meter
and removes the plaintext consumption profile. Then the PC obtains the tariff
information from the supplier and calculates the bill with the original consump-
tion profile. It then presents the invoice, the signed commitments and a Zero
Knowledge Proof to the supplier who verifies the bill’s validity using the homo-
morphic property of the used commitment scheme: The supplier determines the
correctness of the bill by appropriate operations on the received signed commit-
ments and the tariff. If the commitments can be verified on the presented bill,
then the presented bill is trustworthy and correct. The homomorphic commit-
ment scheme we use on the Smart Meter side is Pedersen Commitment [19] and
is shortly outlined in Section 3.
4.2 Protocol specification
Initiation Initially, the SM and BS need to employ some signature scheme
which allows the SM to secure the integrity of data sent to the BS. This is
usually already the case with Smart Meters. They are either part of a PKI or
both, the SM and the BS, have access to a symmetric key for a symmetric signing
scheme. We denote such signing key with Signpriv.
Secondly, the TPM in the Smart Meter must be able to use the Pedersen
Commitment scheme (see Section 3) over elliptic curves with public generators
g and h.
How keys (or the public parameters, such as the generators) are distributed
to Smart Meters is beyond the scope of this paper, but it is already common
practice in on-going Smart Meter deployments.
Smart Meter Privacy Component Back-end systems
V ,R,COMM
T
P (V, T ),r′,COMM,SIGi0
Fig. 3. Communication sequence
Consumption profile reporting and invoice calculation Figure 3 illus-
trates the communication that takes place between the different actors and the
following enumeration of steps describes the protocol in detail:
1. The SM prepares a consumption profile to be reported to BS. The profile
basically consists of a vector of consumption values V = {vi0 , vi1 , ..., vin}.
vik represents the energy consumption of the household in the interval ik.
ik stands for the interval number, incremented since a fictive first interval,
analogous to the definition of the UNIX time stamp.
2. For values in V the SM now creates commitments. The commitment of vik is
Commik = Commit(vik , rik). Where Commit(a, r) stands for the Pedersen
Commitment of a and a random value r with the generators g and h known
to the TPM and the BS.
3. Now, the SM would like to send the data to the BS. Before that can happen,
it protects the data from being manipulated on the way. It creates a signature
SIGi0 (with its signing key Signpriv) over (i0,COMM) and sends it together
with the vector V , the vector COMM = {Commi0, Commi1 , ..., Commin}
and the vector R = {ri0 , ri1 , ..., rin} towards the supplier’s back-end system.
4. The PC intercepts all the traffic between the SM and the BS.
5. The PC obtains the tariff vector T = {ti0 , ti1 , ...tin} from BS and performs
the following two calculations:
(a) P (V, T ) =
∑in
k=i0
vk ∗ tk This is the actual price the customer has to pay
for the reporting period represented by V .
(b) In addition it also calculates r′ from the vector R it intercepted in step
4: r′ =∑ink=i0 rk ∗ tk
6. The PC now sends P (V, T ), r′, COMM, SIGi0 to BS and has finished its
work.
Verification These are the steps performed by the BS subsequently to the
reporting in order to verify that the P (V, T ) was correctly calculated:
First of all, the BS verifies that the signature SIGi0 over i0 and the commit-
ments is intact which means that the commitments it received has been signed
by the TPM and stands for the next vector V = {vi0 , vi1 , ..., vin} starting from
i0.
BS now computes COMMTariff with the Commi it received in step 6 and
the tariff vector T that it made available to PC in step 5:
COMMTariff =
in∏
k=i0
Commtkk
Whether the P (V, T ) sent by the PC has been calculated truthfully with the
correct vi and ti can now be verified by opening the aggregated commitment
COMMTariff. For that, the BS uses P (V, T ) and the aggregate random value r
′
that it received in step 6.
Open(COMMTariff, P (V, T ), r′)
= COMMTariff
?
= Commit(P (V, T ), r′)
4.3 Analysis
Theorem 1 Our private billing protocol is complete, sound and honest-verifier
zero-knowledge.
Proof. For completeness, i.e. if the PC truthfully computes the tariff, then the
BS accepts, we observe the following equation:
Commit(P (V, T ), r′)
=Commit(
in∑
k=i0
tkvk,
in∑
k=i0
tkrk)
=
in∏
k=i0
Commit(tkvk, tkrk)
=
in∏
k=i0
Commit(vk, rk)
tk
=
in∏
k=i0
Commtkk
=COMMTariff
It follows that COMMTariff is a Pedersen commitment for P (V, T ) with the
random number r′.
For soundness we prove that if the PC does not truthfully compute the tariff,
then the BS must reject. That is given vi, the PC cannot forge a view Commi,
P (V, T ) and r′ of the protocol that is accepted by the BS.
We will prove by contradiction. First, observe that we assume that the PC
cannot forge the Commi commitments, since they are signed by the TPM. Sec-
ond, as follows from completeness, the subsequently computed COMMTariff is a
Pedersen commitment to P (V, T ) and r′. If, the PC could present P ′(V, T ) 6=
P (V, T ) and r′′, such that COMMTariff = Commit(P ′(V, T ), r′′) is opened cor-
rectly, then this would be a contradiction to the binding property of Pedersen
commitments as established in [19].
For honest-verifier zero-knowledge, we present a simulator of the view of the
BS given only its input and output. The values Commi and r
′ from the view
of the protocol are uniformly and independently distributed in Z∗q . The tariff
P (V, T ) is public output of the protocol (and input to the verification operation).
The signature Sigi0(Comm1, . . . , Commn) of the TPM cannot be trivially
simulated, since the BS only holds the public key. Nevertheless, since it is only
a signature of randomly distributed values, we could simulate it by inverting
the signature verification operation on a random signature. This rather strange
simulation is an artifact of our unconventional setup of proving having the PC
compute on input from another party – the TPM. In a strict sense, the signature
is not part of the Zero Knowledge Proof, since it is computed by the TPM and
not the PC.
5 Implementation and Evaluation
In this section, we give details on our prototypical implementation, show how
our component can be integrated in real world Smart Meter deployments, and
discuss how our solution fulfills the functional and security requirements which
were identifies in Section 2.4.
5.1 Implementation of the core algorithm
We implemented an exemplary system to identify load on the respective hard-
ware systems during the execution of our protocol. For this purpose, we mod-
eled the SM, the PC and the BS in Java as much as necessary to execute our
protocol. The SM creates a profile, creates respective commitments and signs
commitments. Transport of data is simplified by method calls to the respective
destination component. Obtained data shows the load on the CPU in the dif-
ferent components. Figure 4 shows execution times of the different components
(SM,PC,BS) of the reporting and verification part of the protocol. Execution
times were measured on a Intel(R) Core(TM) i5 CPU M540 at 2.53GHz on a
OpenJDK Runtime Environment (IcedTea6 1.8.1) on a Ubuntu 10.4 system.
112ms 359ms 693ms
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Fig. 4. Execution times of the protocol (reporting and verification stages) at the
different entities
From the numbers in the Figure 4 one can see that most time is spent in the
BS and the PC. The SM does not spend excessively much time with creating
commitment values.
Although the hardware of the Smart Meter, respectively the TPM performing
the actual calculations, is usually several scales inferior to our test system we
believe that the SM is able perform its part of the protocol in a timely manner
[4]. After all, irrespective of other constraints, it has one day before it needs to
perform the next protocol run. The PC can be realized either by a stand-alone
hardware component or by software running on existing hardware (router, Wifi
access points). Therefore, the hardware can be chosen appropriately to stand up
to the requirements of its part of the protocol.
However, one has to take into account that the supplier’s systems will need to
participate in several thousand instances of this protocol per day, one for every
associated household. If we assume that the supplier buffers the received veri-
fication data of concurrent protocol instances it can spread verification (where
all of its time is spent) over the course of a whole day. Then, one such system
(with our hardware) should be able to handle approx. 25000 protocol instances
per day. This could be further increased by only verifying a random choice of
reported prices. This shows, that a supplier should be able to implement our
protocol for millions of users with negligible resources.
5.2 Integration in real world scenario
Regarding the integration of our approach into current Smart Meter setups we
have identified how our approach could use existing protocols of Smart Meter
reporting. From [7] we identified two relevant application layer protocol specifica-
tions for SM to BS reporting: The universal DLMS/COSEM standard suite (IEC
62056 / EN 13757-1) [2] and the simple Smart Metering Language (SML) [8]
specification.
The Smart Meter Language (SML) describes an application and presentation
layer and Smart Meters operate either in a push (SM initiates) or pull (SM
reacts) scenario. All data is encoded in either an SML request or SML response
message. Encryption of SML messages on the application or presentation layer
is not part of the SML specification.
DLMS/COSEM is an application layer protocol. DLMS specifies how one
can talk about energy metering objects. Energy Metering objects are described
by the COSEM specification.The standard does not dictate specific transport
protocols. The Smart Meter operates as server and communication follows the
pull-strategy from the view of the BS system. Read and write access is realized
by transmitting respective COSEM objects in APDUs (Application Protocol
Data Units). The server’s application context determines whether APDUs are
encrypted.
How the privacy component can be embedded in environments employing
SML or DLMS/COSEM depends on a multitude of factors: The actual proto-
cols used on the network/transport layers, the used push/pull strategy as well
whether encryption is used. Those factors determine whether the PC acts as
transparent or visible proxy, how it intercepts messages and whether it needs
key material to decipher messages.
For SML we see a simple straightforward solution how to implement the
privacy component on the application layer: In SML actual consumption profiles
are sent as table with one row for each recorded value. The columns can describe
one entry further with entries like time of recording, error conditions and so on.
The whole table but also individual columns of the table can be signed which
would allow us to fit our protocol into SML messages easily: For every query
(pull-scenario) of consumption values the SM would answer with a table with
the columns: i,vi,Commi,ri. The SM would sign all columns independently but
the PC would intercept the SML response and delete the columns vi and ri
from the table and insert P (V, T ),r′ and COMM into the message. Sigi0 would
be represented by the i’s and Commi’s columns’ intact signatures. This only
requires, that the part of the Smart Meter responsible for creating signatures
also create commitments. The BS system would notice that columns vi and
ri are missing and would therefore switch into a mode where it communicates
with a privacy component and performs the verification part of our protocol.
If a privacy component was not employed the whole table would be transferred
intact and the BS system would perform its normal operation and store the
plaintext values in its database.
For DMLS/COSEM the approach would work analogously but with COSEM
objects and properties instead of SML tables. However, in DLMS/COSEM en-
cryption could make it impossible for the PC to understand the intercepted
APDUs. In such a case, the Smart Meter would either need to be reconfigured
not to use encryption or to use the public key of the PC instead of the supplier’s
public key. This would allow the PC to read and manipulate the APDU and
possibly re-encrypt it for the supplier with the supplier’s public key.
5.3 Fulfillment of stakeholder’s requirements
In Section 2.4 we listed requirements of the different stakeholders for Smart Me-
tering. We will show in this Section how our approach fulfills these requirements.
– In Section 2.4 we mentioned that the supplier’s requirement is the trustwor-
thiness of reported consumption values. Our protocol fulfills this by providing
a trustworthy price instead of individual consumption values. We have given
a soundness proof of our Zero Knowledge proof for the correct calculation of
the price.
– In Section 2.4 we also stated that the customer wants privacy-aware billing.
Our approach achieves a privacy-aware billing with ideal privacy as the con-
sumption profile never leaves the household unprocessed, but only the price.
We have proven the zero knowledge property of our Zero Knowledge Proof,
i.e. the supplier will learn nothing, but the price.
– The infrastructure requirement listed in Section 2.4 is a low-cost Smart Me-
tering solution. Our approach achieves this by only minimal changes to the
software of Smart Meters and supplier’s back-end system. The privacy com-
ponent itself is simple and untrustworthy. It could therefore be implemented
in inexpensive hardware or even in software.
– Finally, in Section 2.4 we mention several requirements regarding the tam-
perproofness, accuracy and confidentiality of the Smart Meter. As our ap-
proach does not interfere with the Smart Meter’s normal operation accuracy
and tamperproofness of the Smart Meter are not changed. We conform to
any regulation we are aware of.
In addition, the supplier might benefit from the use of a privacy component
as well, as less privacy-related data has to be stored in his systems for legal
retention periods. The supplier needs to store all data that he receives from
the PC for being able to reproduce invoice calculation for a certain retention
time but that data is not privacy-related. The commitment values do not
disclose useful information and the only privacy-related data item is the final
price. This reduces the supplier’s need for special security measures of his
systems against internal or external attackers.
Based on the discussion above, it is save to conclude that our approach fulfills all
identified requirements (see Section 2.4) for a privacy-respecting billing of Smart
Metering consumption profiles. Furthermore, as shown in Sections 5.1 and 5.2,
an implementation of our algorithm is suitable to be deployed on a large scale
and fits well with existing standards and infrastructures.
6 Related work
General references concerning security aspects of smart metering: Abstract pre-
dictions about security and privacy challenges potentially coming with the evo-
lution of the current grid to the Smart Grid are described in [13] while [9],[18]
and [6] give more information on the topics of security, privacy and trust in
Smart Grids/Smart Metering and Advanced Metering Infrastructures (AMI).
In [6] Ontario’s (Canada) Information and Privacy Commissioner provides
an overview of what the Smart Grid is, how it will affect electricity consumers
and how their privacy might be at risk by the Smart Grid and Smart Metering.
Furthermore she promotes the idea of building privacy into the Smart Grid from
the start.
Privacy aspects of smart meter-based billing: In [10] a privacy-preserving detec-
tion algorithm for leakages in electricity distribution has been proposed. By ag-
gregation across several Smart Meters the developed algorithm protects individ-
ual meter readings while allowing grid operators to detect illegitimate/unknown
load. Their approach does not allow individual billing, yet this is the main ap-
plication of our paper.
Furthermore, in [5] a model for measuring privacy in Smart Metering is de-
veloped and subsequently two different solutions to privacy are presented: A
Trusted Third Party-based approach, where individual consumption profiles are
aggregated at the third party and only sums are communicated to the supplier.
The other approach attempts to mask consumption profiles by adding random-
ness to the actual profile with an expectation of the random distribution of
zero. In contrast to our solution, both of their approaches cannot handle billing
of time-of-use tariffs but only provide either sums or not-accurate profiles. Fur-
thermore, our approach does not require a trusted third party and provides exact
results for every computation (as required by some legislations).
Finally, in [20] also a twofold approach is presented: The first solution em-
ploys a sophisticated Trusted Platform Module (TPM) in the Smart Meter to
obtain signed tariff data from the supplier and calculate a trustworthy bill. The
second solution makes use of the electrical grid infrastructure as a third party to
anonymize up-to-date consumption values sent out constantly by Smart Meters.
Our approach can be distinguished as it only addresses billing but only requires
a very simple TPM that creates commitments.
Pedersen commitments: Due to their homomorphic properties Pedersen commit-
ments are an effective means to verify the correctness of statistics computation.
In [22] it has been applied in the outsourced database setting. Statistics and
dot product computation can be useful for in many application areas. An exam-
ple from the database community again is privacy-preserving data mining [23].
An example from the business software community is collaborative benchmark-
ing [14].
Our work is the first in providing a very high degree of privacy for customers
by not disclosing consumption profiles in time-of-use Smart Meter billing sce-
narios.
7 Future work
Dynamic, time-depended billing is only one application of fine-grained consump-
tion data. In addition, a profile of a household’s energy consumption can be
utilized by the supplier to create predictions of this household’s energy demand
in the future. Our proposed solution does not cover this usage of consumption
profiles. Realizing a privacy friendly method for calculating such predictions is
subject to future research. However, one must realize that privacy and the ability
to create predictions potentially contradict each other in their nature and this
conflict in the field of Smart Metering should also be investigated further.
8 Conclusion
In this paper we have proposed a protocol for privacy-preserving reporting of
consumption profiles in a Smart Metering scenario by the use of a plug-in compo-
nent. We have identified and analyzed the requirements of different stakeholders.
Based on this analysis, we devised a billing scheme which allows privacy-related
consumption profiles to remain within the household while preserving provable
correctness of the billable amounts. The privacy sensitive data therefore is not
susceptible to interception in transit or leakage in the supplier’s back-end system.
We have provided the specification for the utilized components, for the in-
troduction into a traditional Smart Metering setup, and for the communication
and calculation during the three protocol stages (initialization, reporting, verifi-
cation). After proving the soundness, completeness and zero-knowledge property
of the verification, we investigated the execution times of our prototypical imple-
mentation and showed that it is a viable solution for Smart Metering hardware.
Finally, we discussed how our protocol could be executed using existing Smart
Metering reporting specifications and showed that our approach fulfills the pre-
viously identified stakeholder’s requirements.
Our protocol is one step towards the idea of building privacy into the Smart
Grid [6]. By preserving customer privacy we mitigate trust issues that privacy
experts, the media and the public have raised about the privacy implications of
Smart Metering.
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